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The Limits on University Control of
Graduate Student Speech
Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002).
In the spring of 1999, Christopher Brown, a master's degree candidate
in material sciences at the University of California at Santa Barbara
(UCSB), submitted his thesis for approval. The copy reviewed by Brown's
thesis committee contained no acknowledgments page. After the committee
approved his thesis, Brown inserted an additional two pages entitled
"Disacknowledgements,"' in which he ranted against professors, the
university, former Governor Pete Wilson, and the state of the physical
sciences. The opening sentence set the tone for the entire section. Brown
began, "I would like to offer special Fuck You's to the following
degenerates .... He proceeded to complain about "fascists" in the
university administration, label one professor as a "prick," and call the
university's Board of Regents a "paragon of corrupt mismanagement., 3
When the university learned about the disacknowledgments page, it
declined to file Brown's thesis in its library system and refused to grant him
a degree until he removed the offending material. Brown unsuccessfully
challenged the decision within the university, and, in June 2000, he filed
suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Among other claims,
Brown alleged that the Dean of the Graduate Division and other named
defendants had violated his First Amendment rights. The district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Brown appealed,
and, in a 2-1 decision, a panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court
1. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 943 (9th Cir. 2002), petition for cert.filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3476
(U.S. Jan. 14, 2003) (No. 02-1039).
2. Id.
3. Oliver Burkeman, West Coast Rebel, GUARDIAN (London), June 27, 2000, at 14.
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decision.4 Judge Susan Graber reasoned as a matter of first impression that
the case should be governed by the restrictive First Amendment standard
developed by the Supreme Court for high school students in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier.5 Her opinion represented the first unequivocal
application of Hazelwood to a postsecondary student6 and stands in tension
with decisions in the Sixth Circuit 7 and First Circuit 8 that specifically
declined to apply Hazelwood in the context of higher education. 9
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit reached the right result in
Brown v. Li, but applied the wrong legal standard. The Supreme Court
developed the Hazelwood test in a case involving a high school newspaper.
Its concerns about the "emotional maturity" of high school students and
preventing the views of the speaker from being "erroneously attributed to
the school" are less persuasive in a university setting.' 0 Consequently,
Hazelwood does not provide an appropriate standard for protecting the First
Amendment rights of college and graduate students, who otherwise enjoy
the full legal rights of adulthood." This Comment suggests that the Ninth
4. Judges Susan Graber and Warren Ferguson agreed that Brown's First Amendment claim
should be dismissed, but failed to agree on the reason, leaving the panel without a clear majority
opinion. Judge Ferguson emphasized Brown's deceptive behavior and the power of the university
to punish cheaters. See Brown, 308 F.3d at 956 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
5. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
6. Several courts have considered applying Hazelwood, but no final decision has
unambiguously embraced Hazelwood in a university setting. See Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain
Coll. Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 915 (10th Cir. 2000) (using the Hazelwood test at the urging of both
parties without deciding whether it represents the proper standard for postsecondary cases);
Cummins v. Campbell, 44 F.3d 847, 853 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Hazelwood with a parenthetical
note about the uncertainty of its application to a college setting as part of a qualified immunity
discussion, and concluding that the law about limiting the on-campus screening of a controversial
film was not "clearly established"); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074-75 (11 th Cir. 1991)
(adopting the reasoning of Hazelwood "even at the university level," but framing a new test for
restrictions on the in-class speech of professors that considers "the strong predilection for
academic freedom as an adjunct of the free speech rights of the First Amendment"); Ala. Student
Party v. Student Gov't Ass'n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344, 1346-47 (11 th Cir. 1989) (citing
Hazelwood with approval but ultimately relying on the district court's general finding of
reasonableness rather than on the precise formulation of the Hazelwood test); Welker v. Cicerone,
174 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (indicating in dicta that Hazelwood governs in
university settings, but declining to apply Hazelwood to the restrictions at issue in the case); Lueth
v. St. Clair County Cmty. Coll., 732 F. Supp. 1410, 1414-15 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (distinguishing
Hazelwood but failing to question its applicability in future college cases).
7. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ("Because we find
that a forum analysis requires that the yearbook be analyzed as a limited public
forum ... Hazelwood has little application to this case.").
8. See Student Gov't Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st
Cir. 1989) (noting in dicta that "Hazelwood... is not applicable to college newspapers").
9. The parties disagreed publicly about whether Brown created a circuit split. The attorney for
the university argued that the Ninth Circuit had successfully distinguished Kincaid and Student
Government Ass "n, thus avoiding a circuit split. See David Horrigan, F- Word in Thesis Earns an
F in Court, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 2002, at A4.
10. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72.
11. See Mark J. Fiore, Comment, Trampling the "Marketplace of Ideas ": The Case Against
Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2002).
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Circuit panel should have instead applied the more protective balancing test
that governs cases involving the discipline of professors and denial of
tenure. Application of that test should not alter the outcome in Brown, but it
would lay a better foundation for future cases involving the speech of
university students.
Judge Graber distinguished Brown from other cases declining to apply
Hazelwood in a postsecondary context by emphasizing the difference
between curricular speech and extracurricular speech." In part, such a
distinction tracks traditional First Amendment forum analysis. Judge
Graber noted that an "acknowledgments section has a well-defined form
and purpose in academic writing."' 3 She explained that professors retain an
interest in teaching their students the proper use of acknowledgments.
UCSB communicated this interest to students through its Guide to Filing
Theses and Dissertations, which assigned students and their thesis
committees joint responsibility for ensuring that "everything between the
margins" of their theses would "meet the standards for publishing journal
articles or monographs" in their relevant academic fields.1 4 Judge Graber
seized upon this retention of control by the university to conclude that an
academic thesis "is not a public forum, limited or otherwise." 15 Judge
Graber's forum analysis seems to rest on solid footing. The Supreme Court
has held that the "government does not create a public forum by inaction or
by permitting limited discourse but only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse."' 16 Although the university
approved other nontraditional acknowledgments sections, 17 its lax
enforcement of university policies did not signal a specific intent to change
the terms of its guide.
On its own, this forum analysis would justify affording
acknowledgments sections only limited First Amendment protection. Yet
Judge Graber pushed the distinction between curricular and extracurricular
speech too far by applying Hazelwood and allowing UCSB to impose any
speech restrictions "reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical
12. Brown, 308 F.3d at 949-50.
13. Id. at 952.
14. Id. at 942 (quoting UCSB, GUIDE TO FILING THESES AND DISSERTATIONS (1998)).
15. Id. at 954.
16. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
17. For example, the university approved a Ph.D. dissertation dedicated to "the dumb ass who
left his cooling water ON for a laser that was OFF for 2 years and subsequently flooded my lab,
desk, and my most important files: may your bloated, limb-less bodies wash to shore and be
picked clean by seabirds and maggots." Brown, 308 F.3d at 967 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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purpose." 18 Hazelwood involved the removal of articles about teen
pregnancy and divorced parents from a high school newspaper. A
journalism class produced the paper under the supervision of a faculty
member as part of the high school curriculum. Judge Graber considered
Hazelwood to be the "most analogous" case to Brown because UCSB also
possessed a "strong interest in setting the content of its curriculum and
teaching that content."'19 In drawing this analogy, Judge Graber ignored the
crucial factors discussed below that argue against applying Hazelwood to
postsecondary students.
II
The Supreme Court grounded its opinion in Hazelwood on the
nonpublic nature of the forum involved.20 The test ultimately adopted by
the Court, however, afforded student speech even less protection than
typically provided in a nonpublic forum. Traditional nonpublic forum
analysis requires that content restrictions be "reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum.' The Hazelwood Court only required such
restrictions to be "reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical purpose. 22
This reformulation creates a slippage between the nonpublic forum standard
requiring any restriction to be reasonable in itself and the Hazelwood
language requiring only a reasonable relationship between the restriction
and the final goal. More serious problems emerge when one examines the
subsequent explanation in the Hazelwood opinion of how courts are to
determine whether speech restrictions bear a reasonable relationship to the
goals of public education. The Supreme Court explained that courts should
strike down challenged controls over student speech "only when the
decision to censor... has no valid educational purpose.923 This formulation
effectively removes the word "reasonably" from the Hazelwood standard
and permits any regulation of speech related to a legitimate pedagogical
concern. This is a deferential standard indeed. It is not surprising that
numerous commentators have argued that Hazelwood provides inadequate
First Amendment protection, even for the speech of high school students.24
18. Brown, 308 F.3d at 947.
19. Id. at 951-52.
20. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988).
21. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.
22. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. See, e.g., J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of Student
Press Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlineier, 1988 DUKE L.J. 706, 732;
Nancy J. Meyer, Assuring Freedom for the College Student Press After Hazelwood, 24 VAL. U. L.
REv. 53, 76 (1989); Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 190 (1995); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs-Repression,
Rights, and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 123 (1995).
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The Hazelwood Court offered several justifications for providing
relaxed First Amendment protection to high school newspapers: (1) the
school's pedagogic interest in teaching students journalistic standards, (2)
the emotional immaturity of the paper's audience, and (3) the school's
interest in preventing the views of individual speakers from being wrongly
attributed to it.25 The pedagogy justification remains relevant in the
postsecondary context and will be discussed below. The final two
considerations do not apply with the same force to university students,
26however. In fact, the Hazelwood decision itself explicitly reserved
judgment on whether the standard it articulated should apply in higher
education cases.
27
First, the maturity concerns of Hazelwood prove inapposite in a
university setting. University students are "less impressionable than
younger students., 28 They exercise a panoply of rights not granted to most
high school students, including the rights to vote, serve on juries, purchase
firearms, and serve in the military. Nearly all college students can also
drive, smoke, purchase pornography, sign legally binding contracts, marry
without parental permission, and be tried as adults in the criminal justice
system. Although not perfectly correlated with emotional maturity, age
functions throughout the law as a bright-line rule. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that college students are presumptively entitled to the same
First Amendment protections as other adults.29 Applying Hazelwood to
these students would mark an erosion of their adult rights.
Second, in a university setting, there is less reason to fear
misattribution. University students are more independent than elementary
and secondary students in setting their own research agendas and
expressing their ideas in writing. A third party who might easily assume
that a middle school teacher heavily influenced the positions advocated in a
student paper is less likely to make the same assumption when reading a
college essay. The distinction proves even clearer in a case like Brown that
involves the acknowledgments section of a graduate paper, since custom
dictates that authors control their own acknowledgments. The target
25. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
26. For an extensive discussion of the differences between high school and college that
render Hazelwood inappropriate in the college context, see Fiore, supra note 11, at 1955-58. See
also Gail Sorenson & Andrew S. LaManque, The Application of Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier in
College Litigation, 22 J.C. & U.L. 971, 986 (1996).
27, Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 ("We need not now decide whether the same degree of
deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and
university level.").
28. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n. 14 (1981).
29. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) ("[T]he precedents of this Court leave no
room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections
should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large.").
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audience for a master's thesis like Brown's on calcium carbonate crystal
formation is likely to be quite sophisticated and aware of this custom.
III
The inapplicability of the maturity and misattribution justifications for
the Hazelwood test in a postsecondary setting leaves open the question of
how the remaining justification-the pedagogical interest of the
university-should be weighed against a student's interest in free
expression. This Comment proposes an approach that draws upon the well-
established body of law governing professors who claim that they have
been improperly disciplined or denied tenure as punishment for exercising
their First Amendment rights.3 ° Such cases follow the general test for
retaliation against all public employees established in Pickering v. Board of
Education.31 The Supreme Court held in Pickering that courts should
balance "the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees." 32 Adapted to the student context of the Brown case, a court
applying the Pickering test would balance the university's interest as an
educator against Brown's interest in commenting upon the failings of the
university. This balancing would better ensure that universities do not
engage in improper viewpoint discrimination under the guise of applying
neutral academic standards.33 In contrast to the Hazelwood test, under
which a university can simply demonstrate a relationship between its action
and an educational goal, the Pickering test would require the university to
30. See, e.g., Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 678-82 (6th Cir. 2001); Lighton
v. Univ. of Utah, 209 F.3d 1213, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 2000); Williams v. Ala. State Univ., 102 F.3d
1179, 1182-84 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 257-59 (7th Cir. 1992).
31. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
32. Id. at 568; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (concluding that courts
only need to perform the Pickering balancing procedure if the speaker has commented upon a
matter of "public concern").
33. Commentators and courts have occasionally objected to the use of balancing tests to
determine the scope of First Amendment violations on the grounds that such tests provide
insufficient guidance to parties and therefore unnecessarily chill speech. See Scallet v.
Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996) ("The court notes that it has reservations
about extending the Pickering analysis to the in-class speech of university professors and graduate
school instructors since the test does not explicitly account for the robust tradition of academic
freedom in those quarters."); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 2:59 (4th ed. 2000); Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination Under
the First Amendment: The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529,
583 (1998) ("Regulation of public employees' speech is governed by imprecise public concern
and balancing tests that... impermissibly chill the exercise of First Amendment rights.").
However, it is hard to imagine the proposed test chilling speech any more than the Hazelwood
standard, which requires plaintiffs to prove that objectionable restrictions on speech serve no valid
educational purpose.
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elaborate further on the nature and importance of its pedagogic goal and to
establish a sufficient nexus between the means chosen and the goal pursued
to outweigh the student's interest in free expression.
The analogy between university students and their professors is not
perfect, but it provides better guidance than Judge Graber's application of
Hazelwood. Like the employer-employee relationship, student-professor
interactions at the university level are voluntary and involve adults. In
contrast, elementary and secondary students study in the context of a
custodial relationship based on mandatory attendance laws and the
application of in loco parentis principles. University students, particularly
graduate students, also more closely resemble their professors as they, too,
exercise rights commonly bundled together under the heading of "academic
freedom." 34 Postsecondary students enjoy a great deal of leeway in
choosing their courses and in pursuing research topics. Indeed, UCSB's
insistence that Brown abide by norms of professionalism when writing his
acknowledgments section implies that the university itself recognized the
similarities between his status and that of a professor.
Pickering represents a compromise between the free expression of
those standing in a special relationship with the state and the desire of the
state to control their speech. One of the primary virtues of the test is its
flexibility. Pickering can easily accommodate notions of academic freedom
by placing them on the side of the scales favoring free expression.
Hazelwood, on the other hand, provides little opportunity to consider the
nature of academic freedom because it focuses only on the interests of the
state.3 5
IV
A switch from the Hazelwood test to the Pickering test would not have
changed the outcome in Brown. Professors have a strong interest in guiding
student use of acknowledgments sections because such sections are
34. Academic freedom proves problematic as a legal concept because of disagreement about
whether the right attaches to individuals or institutions. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A
"Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251, 257 (1989). This Comment uses
the term in its more conventional sense denoting the well-recognized need to protect intellectual
inquiry from state interference.
35. In his dissenting opinion in Brown, Judge Reinhardt suggested adopting an intermediate
form of scrutiny requiring the university to demonstrate a substantial relationship between its
restrictions and a legitimate pedagogical concern. Brown, 308 F.3d at 964 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting). The problem with Judge Reinhardt's intermediate scrutiny suggestion is that it
remains wedded to the unbalanced framework of Hazelwood by continuing to focus only on the
state's interest without asking whether the speech itself merits additional protection because it
occurs in a university setting. It therefore fails to weigh the unique status of higher education as a
"marketplace of ideas" in the same manner as a Pickering-style balancing test. See Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (characterizing
classrooms as a "marketplace of ideas").
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common in academic publications and are governed by norms of
professionalism. Students who do not learn the appropriate use of
acknowledgments risk their chances for publication. In Brown, the need for
corrective action was particularly pressing. Not only did Brown fill his
disacknowledgments section with profanity and unprofessional attacks, but
he also included an inordinate number of grammatical errors.36 The
educational benefit of refusing to accept Brown's thesis was clear and
outweighed Brown's interest in expressing his criticism of the university
within his thesis itself.
If the Brown court had switched from Hazelwood to Pickering,
however, it would have laid a better foundation for future cases analyzing
the First Amendment claims of university students. Hazelwood has shown a
remarkable ability to spread from its original context to cover other areas of
secondary education.37 The resulting impact on freedom of speech has been
pronounced. Applying Hazelwood in a university setting risks setting off a
similar chain reaction. Would courts accept a university's desire not to
anger a wealthy donor as a legitimate pedagogical interest? What about the
perceived need to maintain order on campus? What if a college censored a
student newspaper in the name of teaching journalistic standards? The
Pickering test is no panacea, but it provides courts with more leverage to
police the boundary between illegitimate censorship and permissible
educational practice.
-Tom Saunders
36. See Burkeman, supra note 3 (characterizing the disacknowledgments section as a
"vigorous, if occasionally illiterate, tirade").
37. See, e.g., Richard J. Peltz, Censorship Tsunami Spares College Media: To Protect Free
Expression on Public Campuses, Lessons from the "'College Hazelwood" Case, 68 TENN. L. REV.
481, 499 (2001) (discussing Hazelwood's application in cases involving random drug tests, a
student's right to receive information, the management of school facilities, and student attendance
at off-campus parties); see also Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying
Hazelwood to the in-class Bible reading of a fifth-grade teacher).
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